Introduction
Kenya's choice to hold a Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) meeting at Nairobi's Kenyatta International Convention Centre (KICC) ignited severe diplomatic tensions with Sudan. The Sudanese government has charged Kenya with breaching international law while threatening Sudanese sovereignty and described the move as “an act of hostility.”[1] This incident transcends a simple bilateral disagreement by posing deep inquiries into Kenya's regional mediation role alongside the impact of personal diplomacy on foreign policy and the success of African-led conflict resolution methods. This article attempts to place the dispute within expansive theoretical and empirical contexts to deliver a detailed examination of its effects on regional stability and international standards.
Background
The RSF is the militia group responsible for the ongoing civil war in Sudan and its very renown for its flagrant disregard of human rights.[2] Therefore by allowing the RSF to host its official meetings at the KICC, which is one of Kenya’s cultural heritages, is bound to be misconstrued as an affront to Sudan’s sovereignty and a breach of international norms by the Kenyan government. [3] in this regard, the Sudan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accused Kenya of complicity in the RSF’s alleged crimes.[4] The Ministry argued that the said move contravenes principles of good neighborliness (under international law) and Kenya’s prior commitments to avoid supporting hostile activities on its soil.[5]
In response, Kenya defended its actions by stressing that it has always been neutral in regional issues since time immemorial.[6] Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi was quick to remind people about Kenya’s involvement in the Machakos Protocol of 2002, which helped end Sudan’s second civil war, as evidence of its commitment to dialogue over military intervention.[7] However, it’s undeniable that Kenya’s perceived partiality, particularly its alleged personal ties between President William Ruto and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), undermines its credibility as a mediator.
Literature Review
Several theoretical frameworks allow for the examination of the Kenya-Sudan diplomatic conflict regarding Nairobi's RSF meeting. They include, but not limited to; mediation neutrality principles, bilateral relationship impacts on foreign policy, regional conflict resolution difficulties and Africa-wide conflict resolution implications. Through an exploration of these dimensions, this literature review aims to deliver a thorough comprehension of the fundamental dynamics and possible outcomes related to this incident.
1. Neutrality and Mediation in Conflict Resolution
Mediation theory has always stressed about the importance of neutrality in facilitating successful conflict resolution.[8] According to Bercovitch and Jackson, mediators must be perceived as impartial in order to gain the trust of conflicting parties and/or effectively facilitate dialogue.[9] This is one of the most important principles that were employed by Kenya at the inception of Machakos Protocol of 2002 which brought to an end the Sudanese civil war at the time. The Machakos Protocol was largely successful because Kenya’s Special Envoy, General Lazaro Sumbweiywo, was seen as a neutral mediator, untainted by the biases of the conflicting parties.[10]
However, Kenya’s decision to host the RSF, a group accused of destabilizing Sudan, has greatly eroded its perceived neutrality. Sudan’s government has framed this move as a breach of international norms and an act of hostility, meaning their involvement in the affairs of Sudan undermines its credibility as a mediator.[11] Zartman’s concept of “ripeness” in conflict resolution further complicates this issue. Zartman argues that mediators must carefully assess the timing and context of their interventions to avoid increasing tensions.[12] In short, as a GenZ would coin it, mediators should read the room. In our case, this move might have an automatic implication that Kenya has sided with the RSF thus failed the class of principles of effective mediation 101. Zartman further argues that mediators must avoid actions that could be interpreted as taking sides, as such perceptions can alienate key stakeholders and jeopardize the entire mediation process.[13] Therefore, Kenya has done a commendable job at educating mediators on the dangers of overstepping their role and the importance of staying neutral throughout the conflict resolution process.
2. Bilateral Relationships and Foreign Policy
The influence of personal diplomacy on foreign policy is a recurring theme in international relations literature. Khadiagala argues that personal relationships between leaders can both facilitate and complicate conflict resolution, depending on how they are managed.[14] In the case of Kenya and Sudan, the fact the president of Kenya hosted the leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) at State House in 2023, could dent Kenya’s credibility as a neutral mediator.[15] Critics argue that these relationships may have influenced Kenya’s decision to host the RSF, prioritizing bilateral interests over regional stability.[16]
Neack’s work on foreign policy decision-making further illuminates this dynamic. Neack suggests that nowadays, leaders often prioritize bilateral relationships over multilateral frameworks, especially when personal or political interests are at stake.[17] This tendency can lead to unilateral actions that undermine collective efforts, as seen in Kenya’s decision to host the RSF without broader consultation with regional bodies like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or the African Union (AU). Such actions not only strain bilateral relations but also raise questions about Kenya’s commitment to regional solidarity and collective security.
The role of personal diplomacy in shaping foreign policy is particularly relevant in the Horn of Africa, where historical tensions and power struggles frequently intersect with contemporary diplomatic initiatives. As Felix Berenskoetter and Yuri Van Hoef, professors of international relations, have pointed out, foreign policies are oftentimes influenced by personal relationships, potentially at the expense of its broader diplomatic objectives.[18] This trend risks eroding Kenya’s reputation as a neutral mediator and could have long-term implications for its role in regional peace processes.
3. Regional Mechanisms and Collective Action
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) have traditionally played pivotal roles in mediating conflicts in the Horn of Africa. However, unilateral actions by member states, like the one done by Kenya, make it difficult for these regional bodies. Nathan highlights the importance of collective action in ensuring the effectiveness of regional organizations.[19] When individual nations pursue independent agendas, it fragments regional strategies and undermines cohesive approaches to peace and stability.[20]
The current dispute shows the limitations of regional mechanisms in addressing non-state actors like the RSF. De Waal’s analysis of African conflicts emphasizes that groups operating outside formal governance structures pose unique challenges to traditional mediation frameworks.[21] These actors often exploit divisions within regional organizations, leveraging bilateral relationships to advance their agendas.[22] In this context, Kenya’s unilateral engagement with the RSF risks undermining the collective efforts of IGAD and the AU, which have been working to broker a comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan.
Moreover, the lack of a unified regional response to the RSF highlights the structural weaknesses of African-led conflict resolution mechanisms. As Okumu and Atta-Asamoah argue, the effectiveness of regional organizations depends on the commitment of member states to collective action and the ability to enforce compliance with agreed-upon norms.[23] Kenya’s actions, seen as a departure from these norms, expose the fragility of regional solidarity and raise questions about the future of African-led peace initiatives.
4. Precedents and Implications for Conflict Resolution
Kenya’s decision to host the RSF risks setting a dangerous precedent for other nations, potentially leading to a fragmented approach to conflict resolution in Africa. Kaldor warns that the proliferation of non-state actors in conflict zones often exacerbates instability and prolongs violence.[24] By engaging independently with the RSF, Kenya may embolden other factions, undermining internationally recognized governments and complicating peace efforts. This could lead to a situation where non-state actors increasingly bypass regional and international frameworks, seeking bilateral engagements that serve their interests.
Thakur’s work on international norms emphasizes the importance of adhering to principles of sovereignty and non-interference to maintain the legitimacy of mediation efforts.[25] Kenya’s perceived deviation from these norm risks compromising its role as a mediator and could lead to international isolation. Furthermore, the incident highlights the broader challenges of addressing non-state actors in a manner consistent with international law and norms. As Bellamy and Williams note, the international community often struggles to balance the need for inclusivity in peace processes with the imperative of upholding accountability for human rights violations.[26]Kenya’s actions, seen as legitimizing a group accused of atrocities, underscore the complexities of this balancing act.
The implications of this dispute extend beyond Kenya and Sudan, potentially reshaping the landscape of conflict resolution in Africa. If other nations follow Kenya’s example and engage independently with non-state actors, it could lead to a fragmented and ad hoc approach to peacebuilding. This would undermine the authority of regional organizations like IGAD and the AU, making it more difficult to develop cohesive strategies for addressing conflicts. Ultimately, the pursuit of lasting peace in Africa depends on a commitment to collective action, adherence to international norms, and the ability to navigate the complex dynamics of non-state actors in conflict zones.
Analysis
The diplomatic clash between Kenya and Sudan exposes underlying weaknesses in regional diplomatic practices and conflict management strategies. The choice by Kenya to host the RSF demonstrates conflicting interests between its traditional mediation efforts and the impact of personal diplomatic relationships on its international strategy. Kenya's declared dedication to dialogue faces credibility challenges due to perceived partiality which weakens its stance.[27] The incident demonstrates how regional bodies such as IGAD and the AU struggle to address non-state actors and secure unified responses.
This dispute carries significant broader implications. Kenya's behavior as a potential model for independent dealings with non-state entities risks destabilizing collective regional conflict management efforts. At the same time, it strengthens groups that function beyond official governmental systems. The potential for extended conflicts coupled with deteriorating continental stability emerges as a significant threat. The necessity for the international community to support unified approaches while deterring peace-threatening activities remains beyond exaggeration.
Conclusion
Oh, look at the mess we made! It’s such a shame to see how one of the most developed nations in Africa clumsily approached this fragile situation. Are we so oblivious of the intricate equilibrium needed for diplomatic efforts in conflict areas? The move by Kenya to allow a parallel foreign government to be formed in its soil will not only set a horrible trend to other nations but also undermine its credibility as a neutral facilitator in the ongoing conflict destabilizing the region. In order to navigate this predicament, Kenya will need to reevaluate its strategies moving forward. It could start by emphasizing transparent governance, broad participation and complying with the global standards. Additionally, members of the global community will need to strengthen support for joint efforts while deterring behaviors that could worsen disputes. The achievement of enduring peace in the Horn of Africa relies on a steadfast dedication to joint diplomatic efforts grounded in fundamental principles.
REFERENCES
[1] James Butty, ‘Sudan Recalls Envoy to Protest Kenya’s Hosting RSF, Allies’ Voice of Africa (21 February 2025) < https://www.voaafrica.com/a/sudan-recalls-envoy-to-protest-kenya-s-hosting-rsf-allies/7982900.html> accessed 21 February 2025.
[2] John Lujang, ‘The Perils of Pro-Government Militias in African Transition Democracy: Case of RSF in the Sudan’s Conflict’ (2023) 7 International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science.
[3] Brian Kimani, ‘Act of Hostility: Sudan Calls out Kenya for Hosting RSF Group’ Citizen Digital (Nairobi, 19 February 2025) < https://www.citizen.digital/news/act-of-hostility-sudan-calls-out-kenya-for-hosting-rsf-forces-n357880> accessed 21 February 2025.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Melita Ole Tenges, ‘Formation of Parallel Sudan Gov’t in Doubt after RSF Nairobi Presser Cancelled’ Citizen Digital (Nairobi, 20 February 2025) < https://www.citizen.digital/news/formation-of-parallel-sudan-govt-in-doubt-after-rfs-nairobi-presser-cancelled-n357985> accessed 21 February 2025.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Syaiful Anam, ‘Neutrality in Conflict Mediation Process’ (2020) 5 Dauliya Journal of Islamic and International Affairs.
[9] Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods and Approaches (The Michigan University Press 2009).
[10] Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon, ‘Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts (Conciliation Resources, 2006) < https://www.c-r.org/accord/sudan/summary-comprehensive-peace-agreement> accessed 21 February 2025.
[11] Kimani (n 3).
[12] William Zartman, ‘’Ripeness’: the importance of Timing in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution’ [2008] e-International Relations.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Isaac Mugabi, ‘Former African Leaders’ Mediation Efforts Under Scrutiny’ Deutsche Welle (19 December 2022) < https://www.dw.com/en/former-african-leaders-mediation-efforts-under-scrutiny/a-64128498> accessed 21 February 2024.
[15] Kenyan Foreign Policy, ‘RSF to Speak in Nairobi After Sanctions, Genocide Claims’ (13, January 2025) < https://kenyanforeignpolicy.com/rsf-to-speak-in-nairobi-after-sanctions-genocide-claims/> accessed 22 February 2024.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis (4th Edition, Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).
[18] Felix Berenskoetter and Yuri Van Hoef, ‘Friendship and Foreign Policy’ in Cameron Thies (ed), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis (Oxford University Press 2018).
[19] Laurie Nathan, ‘The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organisations’ [2010] Crisis States Research Centre.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Alex de Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power (Polity Press 2015).
[22] Ibid.
[23] Wafula Okumu, The African Union at 20: African Perspectives on Progress, Challenges and Prospects (Institute for Security Studies 2023).
[24] Mary Kaldor, New and old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (3rd Edition, Polity Press 2012).
[25] Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press 2006).
[26] Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’ (2005) 36(1) Security Dialogue 27.
[27] Ole Tenges (n 5).
